Who is takao ozawa

Is the act of June 29, 34 Stats. Is one who is of the Japanese race and born in Japan eligible to citizenship under the naturalization laws? If said act of June 29, , is limited by section and naturalization is limited to aliens being free white persons and to aliens of African nativity and to persons of African descent, is one of the Japanese race, born in Japan, under any circumstances eligible to naturalization?

Is the Naturalization Act of June 29, Comp. Section is found in title XXX of the Revised Statutes, under the heading 'Naturalization,' and reads as follows:.

The act of June 29, , entitled 'An act to establish a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, and to provide for a uniform rule for the naturalization of aliens throughout the United States,' consists of 31 sections and deals primarily with the subject of procedure.

There is nothing in the circumstances leading up to or accompanying the passage of the act which suggests that any modification of section , or of its application, was contemplated.

The report of the House Committee on Naturalization and Immigration, recommending its passage, contains this statement:. The two changes which the committee has recommended in the principles controlling in naturalization matters and which are embodied in the bill submitted herewith are as follows: First, the requirement that before an alien can be naturalized he must be able to read, either in his own language or in the English language and to speak or understand the English language; and, second, that the alien must intend to reside permanently in the United States before he shall be entitled to naturalization.

This seems to make it quite clear that no change of the fundamental character here involved was in mind. Section 26 of the Act Comp. The sections of title XXX remaining without repeal are: Section , relating to honorably discharged soldiers; section Comp. There is nothing in section which is repugnant to anything in the act of Both may stand and be given effect. It is clear, therefore, that there is no repeal by implication.

But it is insisted by appellant that section , by its terms is made applicable only to the provisions of title XXX, and that it will not admit of being construed as a restriction upon the act of It is contended that, thus construed, the act of confers the privilege of naturalization without limitation as to race, since the general introductory words of section 4 Comp. But, obviously, this clause does not relate to the subject of eligibility but to the 'manner,' that is, the procedure, to be followed.

Exactly the same words are used to introduce the similar provisions contained in section of the Revised Statutes. In the first naturalization act provided that——. This was subsequently enlarged to include aliens of African nativity and persons of African descent. These provisions were restated in the Revised Statutes, so that section included only the procedural portion, while the substantive parts were carried into a separate section and the words 'An alien' substituted for the words 'Any alien.

In all of the naturalization acts from to the privilege of naturalization was confined to white persons with the addition in of those of African nativity and descent , although the exact wording of the various statutes was not always the same. If Congress in desired to alter a rule so well and so long established it may be assumed that its purpose would have been definitely disclosed and its legislation to that end put in unmistakable terms.

The argument that, because section is in terms made applicable only to the title in which it is found, it should now be confined to the unrepealed sections of that title, is not convincing. The persons entitled to naturalization under these unrepealed sections include only honorably discharged soldiers and seamen who have served three years on board an American vessel, both of whom were entitled from the beginning to admission on more generous terms than were accorded to other aliens.

It is not conceivable that Congress would deliberately have allowed the racial limitation to continue as to soldiers and seamen to whom the statute had accorded an especially favored status, and have removed it as to all other aliens.

Such a construction cannot be adopted unless it be unavoidable. The division of the Revised Statutes into titles and chapters is chiefly a matter of convenience, and reference to a given title or chapter is simply a ready method of identifying the particular provisions which are meant. The provisions of title XXX affected by the limitation of section , originally embraced the whole subject of naturalization of aliens. The words 'this title' were used for the purpose of identifying that provision and others , but it was the provision which was restricted.

That provision having been amended and carried into the act of , section being left intact and unrepealed, it will require some thing more persuasive than a narrowly literal reading of the identifying words 'this title' to justify the conclusion that Congress intended the restriction to be no longer applicable to the provision.

It is the duty of this Court to give effect to the intent of Congress. He told the court: "My honesty and industriousness are well known among my Japanese and American friends. In name Benedict Arnold was an American, but at heart he was a traitor. In name I am not an American, but at heart I am a true American. He wrote: "In the typical Japanese city of Kyoto, those not exposed to the heat of summer are particularly white-skinned. They are whiter than the average Italian, Spaniard or Portugese.

Read the Court's opinion here , then return to this page and continue. Three months later, the Court heard the case of Bhagat Singh Thind. Thind was born and college-educated in India. The appellant is a person of the Japanese race, born in Japan.

He applied, on October 16, , to the United States district court for the territory of Hawaii to be admitted as a citizen of the United States. His petition was opposed by the United States district attorney for the district of Hawaii.

Including the period of his residence in Hawaii appellant had continuously resided in the United States for twenty years. He was a graduate of the Berkeley, California, high School, had been nearly three years a student in the University of California, had educated his children in American schools, his family attended American churches, and he had maintained the use of the English language in his home. That he was well qualified by character and education for citizenship is conceded.