What islam teaches about terrorism

The key question is not whether Islam is a religion of peace, but rather, whether Muslims follow the Mohammed of Medina, regardless of whether they are Sunni or Shiite. Today, the West is still struggling to understand the religious justification for the Medina ideology, which is growing, and the links between nonviolence and violence within it.

Two main viewpoints have emerged in the debate on the causes of violent extremism in Islam. The difference between them is reflected in the different terminology used by proponents of the rival views.

If Islam is mentioned at all, it is to say that Islam is being perverted, or hijacked. They are quick to assert that Islam is no different from any other religion, that there are terrible aspects to other religions, and that Islam is in no way unique.

All of these terms are designed to convey the religious basis of the phenomenon. The argument is that an ideological movement to impose sharia law, by force if necessary, is gaining ground across the Middle East, North Africa, Southeast Asia, and even in Europe.

The fact is from Woolwich to Tunisia, from Ottawa to Bali, these murderers all spout the same twisted narrative, one that claims to be based on a particular faith. Now it is an exercise in futility to deny that. This school of thought understands that the problem of radicalization begins long before a suicide bomber straps on his vest or a militant picks up his machine gun; it begins in mosques and schools where imams preach hate, intolerance, and adherence to Medina Islam.

But this has not amounted to meaningful ideological engagement. These so-called moderate representatives of Islam insist that violence has nothing to do with Islam and as a result the intolerant and violent aspects of the Quran and the Hadith are never acknowledged or rejected.

There is never any discussion about change within Islam to bring the morally outdated parts of the religion in line with modernity or genuine tolerance for those who believe differently. Despotic governments, civil war, anarchy, economic despair — all of these factors doubtless contribute to the spread of the Islamist movement.

But it is only after the West and, more importantly, Muslims themselves recognize and defeat the religious ideology on which this movement rests that its spread will be arrested.

So in ash-Shura it says: The retribution of a bad action is one equivalent to it. However, whoever pardons and makes reconciliation, his reward lies with Allah. He does not love the unjust. This principie is so important in Islam that even if the enemy becomes cowardly, it does not endorse the deviation from human values.

So after the conquest of Mecca, the Prophet of Islam said instead of revenge and bloodshed today is a day of mercy. Therefore, the distinction between aggression and defense must be distinguished; aggression is unlawful but defense is permissible under certain circumstances. The Qur'an has even forbidden Muslims from re- proaching.

We made attractive to every com- munity their deeds. In his defensive battles, the Prophet of Islam best practiced human and moral principles, even treating his most vicious enemies with humane behavior.

During the Hunayn war, he granted the majority of captives mercy and returned their property to them. In the conquest of Mecca that some Muslims used to chant that today is the day of vengeance, but the Prophet said to them today is a day of mercy, then told the people of Mecca and the leaders of their war, you are all free and there is no worry for you.

The Prophet of Islam during the wars never deprived the enemy of drinking water. In the Kheybar battle he was strongly opposed when he was offered the opportunity to close the waterway or poison the drinking water in the fortress, and forbade the spread of poison in the city of enemies and in general everywhere. During the war, the Prophet said: Do not kill women, children and the elders and do not burn palm trees and crops. Imam Ali PBUH also commands his soldiers: Never start a war with the enemy unless they start, do not kill the fugitives, do not attack the wounded, don't go into their homes, don't attack women, and don't scold anyone.

Ibn al-Jouzi, : The teachings of Islam invite people to live a peaceful life based on theism, justice and purity. Therefore, peace in Islam is an eternal constitution. Even the nature of war in Islam is a defensive one, not an offensive one, because the principle of Islam is peace and coexistence, not conflict, violence and war. In many verses of the Qur'an, God has allowed Muslims to fight only for defense.

Therefore, war in Islam is a secondary principle, not a primary one. The third principle in creating a culture of peace and a non-violent society is to pay attention to the spiritual self-awareness inherent in our human nature that can move people away from violence. Human nature has a tendency for peace and friendship.

Enjoying compassion, and love for others is part of our human nature. Violence is not our nature. Basically, non-violent relationships can bring us closer to our nature and help us connect and return to what is truly a pleasing way of life, one that con tributes to one another's well-being and comfort. Human nature tends to peace, and not violence; violence comes from how we learn, not from our human nature.

The Islamic teachings attempt to invite people to global peace and a peaceful life on the basis of theism, justice and piety. So, in Islam peace is an immortal and primary law. Allah loveth not aggressors. This interpretation of peace which is based on Qur'anic teachings can develop a widespread peace around the world and terminate conflicts in many places. In spite of these principles of peace in Islamic cultural heritage, we question the reason behind the violence in some Islamic societies; violence in various dimensions of direct or structural violence or cultural violence.

To respond to this question, I would say that since there are many types of interpretation of Islamic doctrines from different points of view, and within different Islamic communities, hence, we are faced with the conflicting voices in some fields. However, we should not forget that there are conflicting voices within other religions as well.

It must be stressed at this point that the problem is not with religion per se. It is not the philosophy or the doctrines, it is not the practices or the rituals, which are the issue. Rather, it is our interpretation of religion which constitutes the problem. It is the meaning we attach to certain doctrines and rituals which creates difficulties. Over the centuries, most adherents of most of the faiths have developed an exclusive view of their particular religious tradition.

God is seen as the God of their particular group. Truth and justice, love and compassion, are perceived as values which are exclusive to their religion. The unity that they seek is invariably the unity of their own kind.

Their religion -they are passionately convinced- is superior to other religions. This Islamic theory of peace culture is misused in some Islamic societies because of poor knowledge of Islamic teachings or due to wrong education. And there are different interpretations of religion and its foundations among Muslims and there are also misunderstandings of Islamic teachings. There is no question that the problem is not with the essence of Islam but with the problem of understanding and interpreting Islam.

As a result, people are drawn into violence, war and strife because of some misunderstandings and misinterpretations of Islam's teachings. One of the main causes of misunderstandings and misinterpretations of the Islamic teachings, is Fundamentalism, and the avoidance of rationality.

The use of reason in understanding, and interpreting religion, has always been the subject of serious disputes among scholars throughout the history of religion. As a result of Fundamentalism, and the avoidance of rationality in the religious teachings, the individual has adopted a religious exclusivist approach and considers himself just and salvable, and that all other religions are void and misleading.

One prominent example is the idea of Salafist religious exclusivist. There is no doubt that education in any society can play a key role in human development and consequently in the growth and development of that society.

Education in any society will play an important role in the cultivation of knowledgeable people and in the development of culture, social order and cohesion, the development of civic institutions and thus the development, progress and excellence of society. The human factor is the most important factor in the development, growth and development of a society.

Therefore, in our age of information explosion, education can be the most effective factor in solving political and social challenges. It is so important that some social science experts have said that without cultural and social development, economic development would not be possible. Sadovnik, : 7. My definite suggestion for the realization of a society free of violence and a culture of peace is primarily to teach peace discourse in society.

It has to become a public culture. The discourse of peace must be incorporated as an approach to the educational system. As a matter of fact, some countries have incorporated the discourse of peace into their educational system literature. From kindergarten and elementary school to university level, where there should be a department of peace and conflict resolution. To avoid conflicts and violence in societies on the one hand, cultural and religious pluralism must be accepted, interactions and friendship must be pursued, and on the other hand to reject exclusivism.

Religious tolerance, which is based on the teachings of Islam must be followed. We must learn to embrace cultural and religious pluralism on the one hand, and pursue interactions, friendships and rejection of exclusivism on the other hand to tolerate dissent. In our time, there is an urgent need for good philosophical arguments for religious toleration in the encounter with religious diversity.

They might reinforce settled habits of toleration and justify teaching toleration to people in society. The Kantian response to religious diversity is the view that all religious claims are on a par with respect to truth, because all teach the same thing or make the same claim.

The essential content of the former, of pure religious faith, is the understanding of all moral duties as given by God. Kant held that this content -the claim that all moral duties are given by God- is present in all particular religions. This fundamental religious claim is discoverable and justifiable by reason alone, unaided by revelation, scripture and the like. The Kantian strategy has two essential parts: one is the reduction of all religious claims to a single fundamental claim, and second is the view that the claims of all actual religious communities bear approximately the same relation to this fundamental claim.

There is no public evidence that any one religion is unique or superior to others and thus has closer access to Ulti- mate Reality.

John Hick, a contemporary advocator of a broadly Kantian strategy on religious diversity holds that there are indeed genuine differences and at least apparent incompatibilities among the claims of different religious communities. He divides these differences into three categories: incompatibilities with respect to historical matters, quasi-historical or trans-historical matters, and the ways of conceiving and experiencing religious beliefs.

Hick holds that these incompatibilities that different religions claim are not important in religious regards. Hick describes the Real in terms of the following functions:. Hick, : Muhammed Legenhausen has argued that in the Qur'an we have a pluralist position that tries to explain contradictions, better than Hick does:.

Various means to resolve the contradictions are suggested in the Qur'an itself. See: , , It is also claimed that what was revealed to the different prophets was the same, so that contradictions among creeds must be due to content apart from what was revealed.

Nevertheless an interpretation which places the blame for terrorism on religious and cultural traits runs the risk of being branded as bigoted and Islamophobic. The political motivation of the leaders of Islamist jihadist-type movements is not in doubt. A glance at the theatres where such movements flourished shows that most fed off their political — and usually military — encounter with the West. This was the case in India and in the Sudan in the nineteenth century and in Egypt and Palestine in the twentieth.

The moral justification and levers of power for these movements, however, were for the most part not couched in political terms, but based on Islamic religious sources of authority and religious principles.

By using these levers and appealing to deeply ingrained religious beliefs, the radical leaders succeed in motivating the Islamist terrorist, creating for him a social environment that provides approbation and a religious environment that provides moral and legal sanction for his actions.

The success of radical Islamic organizations in the recruitment, posting, and ideological maintenance of sleeper activists the terrorists are a prime example without their defecting or succumbing to the lure of Western civilization proves the deep ideological nature of the phenomenon. Therefore, to treat Islamic terrorism as the consequence of political and socioeconomic factors alone would not do justice to the significance of the religious culture in which this phenomenon is rooted and nurtured.

In order to comprehend the motivation for these acts and to draw up an effective strategy for a war against terrorism, it is necessary to understand the religious-ideological factors — which are deeply embedded in Islam. M odern international Islamist terrorism is a natural offshoot of twentieth-century Islamic fundamentalism.

The problems addressed may be social or political: inequality, corruption, and oppression. But in traditional Islam — and certainly in the worldview of the Islamic fundamentalist — there is no separation between the political and the religious. Islam is, in essence, both religion and regime din wa-dawla and no area of human activity is outside its remit. The underlying element in the radical Islamist worldview is ahistoric and dichotomist: Perfection lies in the ways of the Prophet and the events of his time; therefore, religious innovations, philosophical relativism, and intellectual or political pluralism are anathema.

These concepts are carried to their extreme conclusion by the radicals; however, they have deep roots in mainstream Islam. Until the s, most fundamentalist movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan Muslimun were inward-looking; Western superiority was viewed as the result of Muslims having forsaken the teachings of the Prophet.

Until the s, attempts to mobilize Muslims all over the world for a jihad in one area of the world Palestine, Kashmir were unsuccessful.

Therefore, any land Afghanistan, Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya, Spain that had once been under the sway of Islamic law may not revert to control by any other law. This duty — if taken seriously — is no less a religious imperative than the other five pillars of Islam the statement of belief or shahadah , prayer, fasting, charity, and haj. It becomes a de facto and in the eyes of some a de jure sixth pillar; a Muslim who does not perform it will inherit hell.

Such a philosophy attributing centrality to the duty of jihad is not an innovation of modern radical Islam. The seventh-century Kharijite sect, infamous in Islamic history as a cause of Muslim civil war, took this position and implemented it. But the Kharijite doctrine was rejected as a heresy by medieval Islam. The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan and the subsequent fall of the Soviet Union were perceived as an eschatological sign, adumbrating the renewal of the jihad against the infidel world at large and the apocalyptical war between Islam and heresy which will result in the rule of Islam in the world.

Along with the renewal of the jihad, the Islamist Weltanschauung, which emerged from the Afghani crucible, developed a Thanatophile ideology 2 in which death is idealized as a desired goal and not a necessary evil in war. An offshoot of this philosophy poses a dilemma for theories of deterrence. The Islamic traditions of war allow the Muslim forces to retreat if their numerical strength is less than half that of the enemy.

Other traditions go further and allow retreat only in the face of a tenfold superiority of the enemy. The reasoning is that the act of jihad is, by definition, an act of faith in Allah. By fighting a weaker or equal enemy, the Muslim is relying on his own strength and not on Allah; by entering the fray against all odds, the mujahed is proving his utter faith in Allah and will be rewarded accordingly. The politics of Islamist radicalism has also bred a mentality of bello ergo sum I fight, therefore I exist — Islamic leaders are in constant need of popular jihads to boost their leadership status.

Nothing succeeds like success: The attacks in the United States gave birth to a second wave of mujahidin who want to emulate their heroes. The perception of resolve on the part of the West is a critical factor in shaping the mood of the Muslim population toward radical ideas. Therefore, the manner by which the United States deals with the present crisis in Iraq is not unconnected to the future of the radical Islamic movement.

In these circles, the American occupation of Iraq is likened to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; a sense of American failure would feed the apocalyptical ideology of jihad. T hese beliefs are commonly viewed as typical of radical Islamic ideology, but few orthodox Islamic scholars would deny that they are deeply rooted in orthodox Islam or would dismiss the very ideology of jihad as a military struggle as foreign to the basic tenets of Islam. The first was the onset of the Cold War, which ended the period of European ascendancy and polarized the whole world, including Muslims, between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Then another major nakba occurred in —the greatest nakba of all in most Arab eyes—when all the Western nations collectively imposed the formation of Israel with no apparent concern for the fate of half a million non-Jewish Palestinians not only Muslims but also Christians and secularists.

Arab humiliation grew as the United States both strengthened Israel militarily against the Palestinians and other Arabs and armed Middle Eastern dictators during the Cold War in return for their often cruel support in the struggle against the Soviet Union. To many Arab intellectuals this seemed to be the final, intolerable blow. But the collapse of the Soviet Union would prove to be yet another catastrophe from the point of view of Muslims who had looked to it for salvation from the United States.

This hope in itself was particularly remarkable because the official atheism of the Soviet Union had long been thought to exclude the possibility of Muslim cooperation. According to Abou el Fadl:. Many of them speak of another Islam, their personal, private faith. No argument here. A far more elaborate and relentlessly negative treatment of Islam is that of ibn Warraq. His strong resentment toward the religion of his childhood resonates with many humanist readers, myself included, whose path out of traditional bondage was mainly intellectual in nature.

This book and The Origins of the Koran , which followed in , are entry points into the slowly expanding literature highly critical of Islam, past and present, in general and in specific detail, with particular focus on contradictions in the Quran and the traditions surrounding the Prophet, violence in the history of Islamic interactions with other groups, and issues of the status of women and the relation of religion to the state. This is required reading for all who may doubt that Islam even has a darker side.

Twice during the past decade I have published in Humanism Today an organ of the North American Committee for Humanism and the Humanist Institute , my own optimistic assessments of chances for the future evolution of Islam in the direction of humanism.

These favorable estimates, while clearly contingent on events yet to unfold, are based on some sixty years of comparative study of the history of civilizations. I then went on to list a few of the hundreds of sources from which my optimism was derived. In the harsh, eerie glare of September 11, what I am saying here may be considered an update of my earlier remarks. It would be hard to make the case that Islam is intrinsically more cruel or violent than Judaism or Christianity.

The Old Testament—the foundation of the Judeo-Christian tradition—echoes, after all, throughout the Quran and can easily match the Quran on a literal basis for violence and brutality. Jews, and later Christians, have never had any problem with ascribing violence to their religion when it served their purposes.

The gradual liberalization of Judaism and Christianity included the metaphorical interpretation of such phrases, with the heavenly host referring to the stars and the angels.

And the cruel punishments set forth in the Old Testament laws notably death by stoning for what the modern world might regard as civil wrongs or misdemeanors or no wrongs at all are all-of-a-piece with the severe hudud punishments called for by Wahhabi jurists in Saudi Arabia and the Taliban in Afghanistan. The brutality of the Christians in the Crusades was unmatched. John L.